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Introduction
The goal of this Essay is to suggest that the First Amendment (as
opposed to strong policy views) does not necessarily condemn a narrowly
drawn and carefully administered statute that would ban racial and religious
“hate speech.” Many scholars apparently believe the contrary.1 But a careful
parsing of Virginia v. Black—a hate speech precedent that critics often
misinterpret, discount, or ignore2—demonstrates otherwise. Of course, part
of the trick is definitional: To survive Constitutional “strict scrutiny,” any
such statute would have to be based narrowly on intent to intimidate, and be
carefully administered by prosecutors and courts.
A brief version of this Essay was delivered at a comparative
constitutional law symposium held at UC Hastings College of the Law in
San Francisco in September 2017. The keynote speaker, Professor Craig
Martin of Washburn University in Canada, brought to light a fact that is often
ignored in United States hate speech debates: For a quarter century, the
United States has been a signatory party to a multinational treaty called the
International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination.3 As Professor Martin notes,4 Article IV of that treaty
requires all “State Parties” to, inter alia, “declare an offence punishable by
law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred . . . .”5
When the United States signed this Convention in 1994, it added a standard
proviso (“nothing . . . shall be deemed to require . . . legislation . . .
incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution . . . .”), and the Senate
similarly reserved when it ratified the treaty.6 Of course, the Supremacy

1. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS, 82–
83 (2017); Michael Dorf, Hate Speech and Private Disassociation, DORF ON LAW (Aug. 28,
2017), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/08/hate-speech-and-private-disassociation.html (“the
constitutionality . . . is unclear, given that as construed by the Supreme Court, the First
Amendment protects hate speech”); Eugene Volokh, No, Gov. Dean, There Is No ‘Hate Speech’
Exception to the First Amendment, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2017, https://www.washington
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/04/21/no-gov-dean-there-is-no-hate-speech-excep
tion-to-the-first-amendment. In the 1980s there was a spate of articles advocating restrictions
on hate speech. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN. But since the U.S. Supreme Court decided
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), scholars have generally adopted the
unconstitutional view.
2. E.g., CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 1; Dorf, supra, note 1; Volokh, supra note 1.
3. International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art.
1, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter ICERD] (87 other
nations have signed this treaty, and 179 nations are “parties” to it).
4. Craig Martin, Striking the Right Balance: Hate Speech Laws in Japan, the United States,
and Canada, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455 (2018).
5. ICERD, supra note 3, art. IV.
6. ICERD, supra note 3.
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Clause requires no less. Nevertheless, it is clear that the United States has
agreed in this treaty to take actions that might well include a ban on racialized
hate speech, if the actions can be accomplished constitutionally.
Compliance with our international treaty obligations is important,7 just
as is compliance with our Constitution. To the extent that both sources of
legal obligation can be lawfully accommodated, they should be.
This Essay proceeds in four parts: a draft statute for critics to shoot at
and a discussion of background contextual factors; a demonstration that
despite the textual absolutism, First Amendment freedoms have never been
absolute; a demonstration that precedent does not condemn a narrow ban on
hate speech; and some explanatory notes regarding the draft statute I present.

I. A Draft Hate Speech Statute and Its Contemporary Context
Below, I present some brief background context for this Essay. In
addition, law essays that remain safely theoretical, without proposing
concrete solutions for critics to shoot at, seem timid and often ineffectual to
me. As such, I offer the following statutory language as a starting point—it
is repeated later in this essay with some explanatory notes:8
A. A Draft Hate Speech Statute
Hate Speech Prohibited:
(a) It shall be unlawful to make any speech at a public gathering or
on public media that asserts or is clearly premised on the racial or
religious inferiority or hatred of a minority group and is intended to
intimidate or injure any individual or members of the targeted group.
(b) An intent to intimidate is defined as an intent to create in the
targeted individual or group a fear of bodily harm or violence. Intent
to injure shall include intent to cause others imminently to injure the
target(s), as well as intent to cause demonstrable nontrivial harm to a
target’s physical or psychological wellbeing. The requisite intent shall
include willful blindness to reasonably known harms caused by such
speech.

7. Indeed, some might argue it is obligatory. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504
(2008) (treaties create obligations but may not be binding federal law absent implementing
legislation). See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and
the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008).
8. See infra notes 16–17.
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B. Background Context

Professor Craig Martin’s lead article for this symposium succinctly
presents comparative perspectives on “hate speech” statutes from three
nation’s perspectives: Japan, Canada, and the United States.9 Martin
usefully opens our eyes to the fact that in 1994, the United States became a
signatory to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (“ICRED”).10 Safe to say, many Americans are still
unfamiliar with this Convention, despite its Senate ratification a quarter of a
century ago. If nothing else, this symposium will help spread the word about
this valuable worldwide initiative to condemn discrimination and hatred
based on race.
As Martin also notes, Japan is “not alone” in confronting pressing
contemporary issues of “hate speech” within a national and legal culture that
strongly protects freedom of speech. The United States is currently
embroiled in similar controversies. The events in Charlottesville, Virginia,
of August 2017 are but one data point in a flood of current moments placing
the condemnation of hate speech in tension with First Amendment values.11
At the same time, racial equality and nondiscrimination principles are
constitutionally enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, an amendment which was itself the product of a battle for racial
freedom.12 We share with Japan and many other nations a common
enterprise in seeking, as Martin puts it, “the right balance” between “freedom
of expression” and “equality” rights.13
My modest goal in this Essay is to inquire whether a carefully defined
and administered statute prohibiting racial “hate speech” can be written in
harmony with the First Amendment. I attempt to do this without value-laden
policy judgments about freedom of speech or racial nondiscrimination.
Some First Amendment scholars would surely answer my inquiry “No!” The
“absolutist” view, that our Constitution’s First Amendment must tolerate

9. Martin, supra note 4.
10. See ICRED, supra note 3.
11. See Alyxandra N. Vernon, Letting the Devil Speak: Proposals to Protect the Integrity of
the First Amendment While Maintaining Public Safety at Demonstrations (unpublished student
note) (detailing the Charlottesville events); Maggie Astor et al., A Guide to the Charlottesville
Aftermath, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesvillevirginia-overview.html (“violence erupted” at and after a “white nationalist rally,” including the
death of one protestor and thirty-four wounded); Benjamin Wallace Wells, Battle Scars: How
Virginia’s Past Spurred a Racial Reckoning, NEW YORKER, Dec. 4, 2017, at 32–37.
12. “No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV; see, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988).
13. Martin, supra note 4, at 481.
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even the most hateful racist views, has a respectful, albeit relatively recent,
pedigree.14 Indeed, that view has been voiced even as America witnessed
vitriolic white supremacist and Nazi-inspired ethnic attacks and violence in
Charlottesville in August 2017.15 I use the word “attacks” advisedly—it was
hateful speech and unrestrained freedom of expression that generated the
massive and hostile public gatherings in Charlottesville, and a young woman
was killed as a direct result.16 This recent episode, as much as any other,
demonstrates the power that vitriolic hate speech can have. Indeed, as noted
immediately below, many today view such speech itself as a direct attack on
the psyche of minority individuals and groups.
C. The Harms Caused by Hate Speech17

The injurious effects of racial and religious hate speech18 have been well
explained and documented elsewhere; this Essay does not pretend to
rehearse them here.19 Briefly, hate speech has injurious repercussions well
beyond the immediate effect of the words themselves, that is, more than
tangible violence that may be immediately engendered. Indeed, violence
stemming from hate speech and the detrimental psychological effects that
may follow, are intertwined. As one expert researcher writes, “when hate is

14. See generally Zachary S. Price, Our Imperiled Absolutist First Amendment, 20 U. PA. J.
CONST. L.J. (forthcoming 2018); ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE
(2007).
15. See sources cited supra note 11.
16. Wells, supra note 11, at 36. Indeed, a lawsuit has been filed seeking damages for the
hateful protests in Charlottesville. See Complaint, Sines v. Kessler, No. 3:17-CV-00072-NKM
(W.D. Va. Oct. 11, 2017).
17. With apologies for my simplistic overview as opposed to the thoughtful and exhaustive
treatment of this topic in JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012). The harms
caused by racialized hate speech have also been well laid out by other scholars such as Mari
Matsuda, Richard Delgado, and Patricia Williams. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 1,
at 84 (citing sources). For example, “[t]he experience of being called ‘nigger,’ ‘spic,’ ‘Jap,’ or
‘kike’ is like receiving a slap in the face. The injury is instantaneous.” Charles R. Lawrence, If He
Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 483. See also
WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (Mari Matsuda et al. eds. 1993).
18. This Essay and the ICERD focus on racial hate speech. But the injurious effects of Nazi
hate speech against Jews leading to World War II, considered in light of the current American
resurgence of anti-Muslim speech, also supports (without more, I think) the extension of the ideas
in this Essay to religion.
19. See sources cited supra note 17.

10 LITTLE (11 MAR) (DO NOT DELETE)

582

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

3/14/2018 2:04 PM

[Vol. 45:3

physically in your brain, then you think hate and feel hate, you are moved to
act to carry out what you physically, in your neural system, think and feel.”20
Beyond physical violence, individuals and communities are affected by
the injurious and lasting psychological impacts of hate speech. Hate speech
can cause its targets to turn to self-harm or suicide, as well as damage their
confidence and self-esteem.21 Moreover, the harmful mental health
repercussions of hate speech are not temporary. As Dr. George Lakoff has
recently written, hate speech “changes the brains of those hated for the
worse, creating toxic stress, fear and distrust . . . . This internal harm can be
even more severe than an attack with a fist.”22
Finally, the harms to minority-group targets living within the larger
community ought not be ignored:
When a society is defaced with anti-Semitic signage, burning crosses
and defamatory racial leaflets, [a societal] assurance of security
“evaporates. A vigilant police force and the Justice Department may
still keep people from being attacked or excluded,” but the objects of
hate speech are deprived of the assurance that the society regards them
as people of equal dignity.23

Having in mind the idea that hate speech can indeed cause injury, both
physical and psychological, to communities as well as to individual targets,
the events in Charlottesville and the contemporary resurgence of “white
supremacy” and other racial hate speech in the United States, provides a
crucible in which to examine the absolutist First Amendment view.

II. Freedom of Speech Has Never Been Absolute Under the
First Amendment
A discussion of our Supreme Court’s First Amendment precedents is
much like Judge Leventhal’s description of using legislative history: Looking

20. George Lakoff, Why Hate Speech Is Not Free Speech (Sept. 8, 2017), https://georgelakoff.
com/2017/09/08/why-hate-speech-is-not-free-speech/. Dr. Lakoff is a retired Distinguished Professor of
Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley.
21. See, e.g., Timothy Jay, Do Offensive Words Harm People?, 15 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y,
& L. 81, 84 (2009) (“Suicide rates for ethnic immigrant groups in the United States are significantly
predicated by the degree of negativity of hate speech directed toward them.”).
22. Lakoff, supra note 20.
23. Michael W. McConnell, You Can’t Say That: Review of ‘The Harm in Hate Speech’ by
Jeremy Waldron, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/books/review/
the-harm-in-hate-speech-by-jeremy-waldron.html. See WALDRON, supra, note 17, at 4–5.
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over the heads at a crowded party and picking out your friends. Which is to
say, there are dozens and dozens of First Amendment Supreme Court
precedents—it is not difficult to selectively focus on one’s favorites, picking
out snatches of phrases that support conclusions running in opposite directions.
Moreover, my experience is that First Amendment evaluation is often
driven more by one’s assessment (and one’s preferred hierarchical ranking)
of the underlying values that one believes the First Amendment serves, rather
than the amendment’s actual text or history.
Apologies if the following account is subject to criticism along both
these lines. Here are the friends I see at this First Amendment party.
A. Our Protective First Amendment Doctrine is a Creation of the
Twentieth Century and Has Always Recognized Exceptions

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution sure sounds
absolute: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”25
But it must be acknowledged that this “plain language” has never been
interpreted to be absolute.26 In fact, while some speech-inhibiting statutes
have been struck down (all within the last one-hundred years), other statutes
that undeniably “abridg[e] the freedom of speech” have been upheld against
constitutional challenge ever since the Amendment was adopted in 1790.27
Indeed, as the Supreme Court has noted, at the time of the Constitution’s
framing, “[t]he guaranties of freedom of expression in effect in 10 of the 14
States which by 1792 had ratified the Constitution, gave no absolute
protection for every utterance.”28 Instead our Supreme Court, which is
accepted in the United States as possessing the constitutional authority to

24. Justice Scalia employed this analogy and attributed it to Judge Harold Leventhal in
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). In fact, I heard other judges
invoke it when I was a D.C. district court law clerk to Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer in 1982. See, e.g.,
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court
Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (recounting a conversation with Judge Leventhal).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
26. Or, as Professor Martin puts it, although the language is “apparently unqualified,” the
Supreme Court has developed a “complex web of doctrine” to uphold some limits on expression.
Martin, supra note 4, at 482.
27. Constitutional scholars have long noted that one of the earliest Congresses (the Fifth)
enacted the Sedition Act in 1798, which made it a crime to “write, print, utter or publish . . . any
false, scandalous, and malicious writing against the government of the United States, with the intent
to . . . excite . . . the hatred of the people of the United States . . . .” 1 Stat. 596. Enacted by the
same Federalists that had founded the Union, and vigorously criticized by other constitutional
Framers, that statute was never struck down as unconstitutional but expired by its own terms in
1801. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
28. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957).
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“say what the law is,” has repeatedly defined categories of speech that are
unprotected, or only partly protected, from legislative infringement.
Indeed, once “robust” free speech protections began to develop in the
mid-twentieth century, the “trick” in First Amendment doctrine—that is, the
doctrinal mechanism that is used to avoid First Amendment condemnation of
laws that abridge speech—has been to define certain types of expression that
we wish to prohibit as being “not speech” within the Amendment’s compass.30
While Professor Martin suggests that freedom of speech should be “balanced”
against the dangers of racial hatred, our Supreme Court has more often
condemned “balancing” regarding free speech interests. (As Justice Scalia
famously noted in other contexts, talented jurists can “balance” their way to
almost any conclusion.31) Instead, our Court has generally adopted a
categorical approach to protecting free speech—an “absolutist” stance of
protection—and then developed or discovered categories of expression that
are simply announced, ipse dixit, to be outside Constitutional protection.
Thus, for example, federal and state governments can undoubtedly make
laws that abridge the right to express one’s sexuality, so long as that expression
meets some community definition of “obscenity.”32 Obscenity, the Supreme
Court held, is simply “not speech” protected by the First Amendment.
Similarly, the Court has defined categories of “commercial speech”
which are either unprotected, or partially protected but still subject to
restriction—that is, not protected by the same “strict scrutiny” that real
speech gets.33 Does the First Amendment mean “no law,” or just “not very
restrictive law”?
Most relevant for the topic at hand perhaps, is the long-recognized “not
speech” category that has been labeled “fighting words.” Seventy-five years
ago, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court described this category as
encompassing words whose “very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an

29. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1927).
30. See, e.g., Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (“obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech”).
31. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 96 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(multipart balancing tests can lead to any result “favored by the personal (and necessarily shifting)
philosophical dispositions of a majority of this Court”); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enter.,
486 U.S. 888, 897–98 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
32. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
33. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1478 (5th ed. 2017). Indeed, it was
only in 1975 that the Supreme Court ruled that some commercial speech received any protection at
all. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821 (1975). Previously the Court had held that “the
Constitution imposes no restraint on government [prohibition of] . . . purely commercial
advertising.” Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
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immediate breach of the peace.” I want to put down a marker right now on
this phrasing: the “or” has significance, even if some modern commentators
tend to ignore it. This Chaplinsky test, which is still used by the Supreme
Court and others today, is clearly written to encompass two different
categories of speech: Words that “inherently provoke a violent reaction” or
words that injure, “by their very utterance.”35 Some later cases and current
scholars tend to emphasize the former category, and ignore the latter.36 But
the concept that speech can itself injure, and that such speech may be
restricted or even banned, is also accepted, then and now.37 And in
considering hate speech prohibitions, it is vitally important. The alternative
category of Chaplinsky—words that “by their very utterance inflict injury”—
cannot be ignored in a fair evaluation of the doctrinal constitutionality of
speech-limiting laws.
Related to the category of unprotected “fighting words” is another
prohibitable category of expression: “true threats.” The Supreme Court has
described this category as reaching “those statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”38
Importantly for present purposes, this category (which like Chaplinsky
retains currency today) extends to threatening speech that creates fear in the
target even if expressed without intent to actually cause harm. Thus, the
majority39 in Virginia v. Black explained that to fall outside the protection of
the First Amendment, “the speaker need not actually intend to carry out the
threat. Rather, the prohibition of true threats ‘protects individuals from the

34. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis supplied).
35. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 1, at 91 (“Chaplinsky appears to recognize
two situations . . . .”) (emphasis supplied); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
36. Thus, current scholars often rely instead on a test of First Amendment constitutionality
that was pronounced more recently, in Brandenburg v. Ohio: “the constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added).
But this test plainly goes only to one of the two categories in the Chaplinsky formulation.
37. Rather than Brandenburg, one must look to Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), to
find a description, and application, of the second category of speech that can be prohibited: words
that “by their very utterance” injure the target of the speech.
38. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
39. I sometimes use “majority” rather than “the Court” to draw attention to the fact that in
many significant First Amendment decisions, whether upholding or condemning expressionabridging laws, the Justices have not been unanimous; instead, reasonable minds on the Court have
differed.
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fear of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders.’” Again,
these statements by the Supreme Court cannot fairly be ignored or wished
away. Black holds that the First Amendment permits expression-limiting
laws that protect against “fear” and “disruption.”41 Any doctrinal evaluation
of any hate speech prohibition must confront these precedents and persuade
constitutional scholars why they ought not apply.
In sum, as the Supreme Court recognized in its most recent “hate
speech” decision, “[t]he protections afforded by the First Amendment . . . are
not absolute.”42 Instead, “we have long recognized that the government may
regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.”43
(Also of interest is that in both Black and R.A.V., the Court endorsed a
“balancing,” rather than categorical, view. Citing two prior decisions, the
five-Justice Black majority wrote that, “[t]he First Amendment permits
restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.”44)
B. Countervailing Values Disfavoring the Prohibition of Racial and
Religious Hate Speech

Against this doctrinal background, it is certainly true that certain
moments—many moments—in our nation’s history have tested our
commitment to First Amendment values: inter alia, the Sedition Acts; the
Civil War; World War I-era antidraft, antilabor, and red scare episodes; anticommunism moments such as 1950s McCarthyism; the civil rights struggle
in the 1950s-70s; and anti-Vietnam war protests. The 2017 resurgence of
publically advanced anti-Muslim and white-supremacy viewpoints is
another such moment.45

40. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (emphases added) (quoting R.A.V. v.
City of St Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,
708 (1969)).
41. Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60.
42. Id. at 358.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 343 (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382).
45. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Alt-Right Gathering Exults in Trump Election with Nazi-Era
Salute, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/alt-right-salutes-donaldtrump.html; Maria Perez, KKK Leader David Duke Tweets ‘Thank God For Trump! That’s Why We
Love Him!’, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 29, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/kkk-leader-david-duke-tweetsthank-god-trump-thats-why-we-love-him-726023; Simran Jeet Singh & Hansdeep Singh, The Rise of
Hate Crimes Can Be Tied Directly to Hateful Speech, DAILY BEAST, Sept. 6, 2012, https://
www.thedailybeast.com/the-rise-of-hate-crimes-can-be-tied-directly-to-hateful-speech.
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Certainly, the often-expressed fear of “slippery slopes,” when giving
the government power to suppress speech, is a real and valid one. Indeed,
my anecdotal experience in preparing and delivering this Essay is that a
liberal condemnation of any type of hate-speech statute ultimately depends
not on doctrine (which as shown above is mixed) but on a fear of slippery
slopes (and the inevitable discretion that statutes provide for slipping) that is
well-grounded in our history. That is, even if some precedents might support
a narrowly drawn hate speech prohibition, critics oppose it out of fear of
maladministration. The objection goes something like this: “Government
has proven repeatedly over time that it can never be trusted to enforce speech
prohibitions fairly and narrowly, but will instead use them to advance its own
agenda and interfere with those opposed to its agenda.”46 Indeed, examples
of powerful actors using anti-expression laws for malign purposes are not
difficult to find.47 What would be the consequences of a statute prohibiting
hate speech? Nothing but bad, in the long run, say critics. I agree with this
concern. I think it is vitally important as a normative matter to ask, what
slippery slopes would such a law likely lead to, as well as judge to which it
would not?
For these reasons, any part of a legal structure founded on a prohibition
of hate speech, even if narrowly drawn, should be devoted to ensuring steady
and careful administration of the law once adopted. That is to say, potential
and actual misuse of a law by prosecutors and courts must be part of the
constitutional evaluation of any statute.48 Broad grants of discretion in
statutory language should be avoided, and the subsequent exercise of
executive branch discretion should be carefully monitored and judicially
checked. Slopes become slippery when statutory language is imprecise or
when judicial oversight is too light-handed. I cannot stress enough that even
if a hate speech statute were narrowly drawn to survive doctrinal attack,
executive branch misuse of such a statute, beyond the circumstances and
motivations of its enactment, should provide constitutional ground to strike
it down.

46. Conversations with Professor Matt Coles, U.C. Hastings College of the Law, and a former
Deputy National Director of the ACLU (Fall 2017). I greatly value Matt Coles’ real-world
litigation experiences in this area, and his strongly held views certainly give me pause.
47. See e.g., CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 1, at 106 (arguing that anti-hate-speech
codes at universities “are often used to punish the speech of people who were not their intended
[protected] targets . . . . [M]embers of minority groups themselves—the very people whom the law
is intended to protect—are likely targets of punishment”). To this point, however, my draft statute
would apply only to the targeting of minority groups, see infra p. 601 and note 128.
48. Thus, for example, the Court has made the opportunity for prosecutorial misuse of
discretion part of its constitutional “vagueness” analysis for criminal statutes. See, e.g., Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 73 (1999).

10 LITTLE (11 MAR) (DO NOT DELETE)

588

3/14/2018 2:04 PM

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 45:3

Further normative assessment, however, is beyond the limited scope of
this Essay. I certainly share the misgivings of slippery slopes and
government misuse, particularly in the First Amendment arena. It is not
difficult to point to dark episodes in our country’s history where hysteria has
overcome constitutional reason and First Amendment principles were
discounted or ignored in the face of perceived exigency. But to be fair, no
dispositive answers to questions like these can be found in constitutional text,
originalist (or subsequent) American history, or Supreme Court precedent.
In the end, all we can do is suggest extremes that we agree are
constitutionally in or out of bounds, and then examine proposed statutory
language to see whether we think it should stand or fall. My only goal here
is to rebut the claim that current constitutional doctrine necessarily
condemns a careful hate-speech statute. I think it clear that it does not.

III. First Amendment Precedents Do Not Condemn a Narrow
Hate Speech Prohibition
The case that is key to a current analysis of any hate speech prohibition
statute is Virginia v. Black, which although almost fifteen years old is still
the Supreme Court’s latest word on the topic.49 But before analyzing Black,
a few earlier cases deserve mention. A brief survey shows what I think is an
almost unbroken line of authority that can support banning hate speech that
injures, or is intended to injure, or engenders realistic fear of harmful injury
in its targets.
A. A Brief History of Relevant First Amendment Precedents

To repeat, the current robust (or “absolutist”) vision of First
Amendment speech freedoms is entirely a creature of the twentieth century.50
Constitutional law casebooks today tend to begin with discussion of cases
around the time of WWI, with merely a wave at any prior history.
But there is some prior history—and it is not supportive of the robust,
absolutist view that has been accepted by many since the 1960s. First, as
noted above, the Fifth Congress, comprised of at least some of our
constitutional “founding fathers,”51 enacted the Sedition Act of 1798,

49. See infra note 96 (discussing why the decision in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017)
is inapposite to the hate speech debate).
50. See, e.g., David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1213 (1983); David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years,
90 YALE L.J. 514, 516, 519 (1981); LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 2–3 (1960);
ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941).
51. See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 487
(1983) (noting the “clashing views” of the constitutional Framers regarding the Sedition Acts). In
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making it a crime to “write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous,
and malicious writing against the government of the United States, with the
intent to . . . excite . . . the hatred of the people of the United States . . . .”52
Although the constitutionality of this federal statute was hotly debated, many
persons were convicted under it and served prison time. And the law was
permitted to expire in 1802, rather than ever declared unconstitutional.53
What then followed, in terms of First Amendment jurisprudence, was
in the words of one commentator a “lamentabl[e] . . . century of silence,” at
least from the U.S. Supreme Court.54 Speech-protective precedents from the
nineteenth century are never cited, if they exist. For example, application of
the common law of defamation against speech and the press was broadly
accepted when the First Amendment was written—the field was not
accorded strong constitutional protections until the landmark 1960 decision
in New York Times v. Sullivan.55
1. Early to Mid-Twentieth-Century Precedents

Indeed, even early in the twentieth century, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a new Sedition Act, that of 1918. In Abrams v. United
States,56 the Court affirmed the conviction of persons (Russian immigrants)
for circulating leaflets that were critical of sending American troops to
Eastern Europe after the Russian revolution. While it is often Justice

fact, as Jud Campbell has noted in a recent comprehensive review, “the meanings of speech . . .
freedoms at the Founding remain remarkably hazy.” Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First
Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 249 (2017).
52. 1 Stat. 596. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Story of the Sedition Act of 1798: ‘The Reign of
Witches’, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 13–38 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds.,
2012).
53. Perhaps this point is anachronistic, since the principle of judicial review of federal statutes
for their constitutionality was not announced by the Supreme Court until a year later in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Still, Congressional enactment of the Sedition Act, and its signing by
then-President (and constitutional Founder) John Adams, as well as its acceptance by most states,
suggests that a significant number of contemporary First Amendment framers and supporters saw
no irreconcilable conflict. Indeed, the debate regarding the Act was more political than legal
(Thomas Jefferson and others arguing that it violated States’ rights under the Tenth Amendment),
as part of the hotly-contested Presidential election of 1800. Nevertheless, by 1964 the Court was
undoubtedly correct in stating that constitutional concerns regarding the Sedition Act “ha[ve]
carried the day in the court of history.” New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
That twentieth century doctrinal statement does not, however, detract from whatever the Framer’s
original understanding may have been.
54. WAYNE BATCHIS, THE RIGHT’S FIRST AMENDMENT 11 (2016).
55. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also FLOYD ABRAMS, THE SOUL
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2017).
56. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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57

Holmes’s dissent in Abrams that scholars like to quote, the conviction for
publishing dangerous ideas persists as a never-overruled First Amendment
precedent. The Court applied a “clear and present danger” test, relying on
Holmes’s famous dictum, written just months before, that of course “the
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theater.”58 I will mention this dictum again below—
because it is clearly based on the protection of others from harms created by
the speech itself, not an imminent (indeed, not any) violation of law.
In point of fact, the First Amendment was not held applicable to state
laws at all until 1925 (via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).59 It is no overstatement to note that the doctrine of First
Amendment protections for unpopular speech is recently developed and is
based more on strongly held modern views and policies than on the
Amendment’s plain language or original intent.
Again, in 1942 in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court
acknowledged in a unanimous opinion that “[t]here are certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”60 Among these
categories, the Court noted, were “insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.”61 To repeat, the “or” in this of-quoted definition plays
an important function. Insulting words—those “which by their very
utterance inflict injury”—are viewed as different from—but in some cases
just as unprotected as—words that lead to imminent law-breaking. Both
categories were uncontroversially viewed, in the 9-0 Chaplinsky decision, as
unprotected by First Amendment principles.62
Then in 1952, the Court specifically upheld what was clearly a “hate
speech” criminal statute, against constitutional attack. This case is largely
forgotten today or, as Professor Martin notes, dismissed as “no longer good

57. E.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 991–92
(3d ed. 2006). See Andrew Cohen, The Most Powerful Dissent in American History, ATLANTIC,
Aug. 10, 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/08/the-most-powerful-dissentin-american-history/278503/.
58. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Holmes, J., for a unanimous Court,
upholding a conviction for the circulation of a leaflet opposing the WWI draft).
59. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
60. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
61. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (emphasis supplied).
62. The decision in Chaplinsky was unanimous, and written by the liberal Justice Frank
Murphy, 315 U.S. at 768, 774.
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law.” Joseph Beauharnais was the president of the White Circle League in
Chicago. He circulated a leaflet urging “[o]ne million self-respecting white
people in Chicago to unite,” and decrying “the white race being mongrelized
by the negro,” and he urged the government to “halt the further
encroachment . . . of white people . . . by the Negro.”64 The leaflet was a
stark example of pure racial hatred. Beauharnais was tried under a state
statute prohibiting the publication of any “lithograph” that “exposes the
citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision or obloquy
or which is productive of breach of the peace.”65 (Again, note as in
Chaplinsky the “or” here, separating hateful speech from speech that
produces violations of law.)
Beauharnais’s conviction was, like
Chaplinsky’s and Abram’s, affirmed.
Justice Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court in Beauharnais reminded
readers of “the tragic experiences of the last three decades . . . . From the
murder of the abolitionist Lovejoy in 1837 to the Cicero riots of 1951” (both
events, I would wager, forgotten to most 2017 memories66), there had been
“exacerbated tension between races, often flaring into violence and
destruction.”67 Today, we need look back only to Charlottesville in August
2017 to accept that this important governmental interest has not abated.
Justice Frankfurter wrote, and we might well agree, that it would be to “deny
experience” to say that the State was without good reason to seek to condemn
“malicious defamation of racial and religious groups, made in public places
and . . . calculated to have a powerful emotional impact . . . . ‘There are
limits to the exercise of the liberties [of speech and of the press].’”68
The Beauharnais Court acknowledged that a hate-speech statute like
Illinois’ might not solve the problems of race relations, and even “might
itself raise new problems.”69 But this “is the paradox of reform. It is the
63. Martin, supra note 4, at 484. Somewhat less strongly, Dean Chemerinsky notes that
Beauharnais “never has been overruled” and says that it “is the strongest authority for the
government to regulate racist speech.” He then suggests only that “for many reasons it is
questionable whether Beauharnais is still good law.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 1012. See
also BATCHIS, supra note 54, at 78 (“largely discredited” reasoning).
64. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 252, 276 (1952) (emphasis supplied).
65. Id. at 251.
66. See H.M EDWARDS, “NO, N-O-E, NO:” THE CICERO RIOT STORY (2011); JOHN
GLANVILLE GILL, TIDE WITHOUT TURNING: ELIJAH P. LOVEJOY AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
(1958). The 1837 murder of newspaper editor Lovejoy was sustained in prominence when it was
mentioned by candidate Abraham Lincoln in his famed “Lyceum Address” in 1838. See Abraham
Lincoln’s Lyceum Address, ABRAHAM LINCOLN ONLINE, (2017), http://www.abrahamlincoln
online.org/lincoln/speeches/lyceum.htm.
67. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258.
68. Id. at 261 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)).
69. Id. at 262.
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price to be paid for the trial-and-error inherent in legislative efforts to deal
with obstinate social issues.”70 The Court then endorsed “group protection
on behalf of the individual”—in other words, permissibly banning hateful
speech of racial groups due to the harms that could befall individual members
of the target group.71 “[A] man’s job and his educational opportunities and
the dignity accorded him may depend . . . on the reputation of the racial and
religious group to which he . . . belongs.”72
2. The 1960s: Brandenburg Narrows the Doctrine

The 1960s however, saw a change in First Amendment doctrine—
driven of course by huge changes centered around now-distant cultural
moments of widespread speech advocating criminal resistance to
government, by civil rights activists, Black Panthers, and anti-Vietnam War
protestors alike. In 1969, the Supreme Court struck down an Ohio “criminal
syndicalism” statute used to convict a Ku Klux Klan leader who had
advocated “unlawful methods of terrorism” in a speech at a cross-burning
rally.73 The Court unanimously concluded that Brandenburg was guilty only
of “mere advocacy,” rather than “incitement to imminent lawless action.”74
Announcing a new formulation of First Amendment doctrine, the
Brandenburg Court ruled that “[a] statute which fails to draw this distinction

70. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 262.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 263. The Court went on to also reject a constitutional vagueness challenge; it is
that portion of the opinion which is most easily assailed today, as the statute at issue seems quite
vague. Justices Black, Reed, Douglas, and Jackson dissented from the Beauharnais ruling in
separate opinions, although two of the four appeared to agree that some hate speech may be banned.
Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 267, 277, 284, 287. Justice Douglas agreed with the majority that
“conduct directed at a race or group” like that of “Hitler and his Nazis” could “be made an indictable
offense”—but “the peril of [such] speech must be clear and present, leaving no room for argument,
raising no doubts as to the necessity of curbing speech in order to prevent disaster.” Id. at 284.
Justice Jackson similarly agreed “that a State has power to bring classes ‘of any race, color, creed,
or religion’ within the protection of its libel laws.” Id. at 299. His objection was based on the
absence of procedural safeguards, not the First Amendment.
73. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445–446 (1969), was issued as a per curiam opinion,
but as Professor Bernard Schwartz later discovered, that was not because it was simple. The first
draft had been authored by Justice Abe Fortas, and endorsed the “clear and present danger” test
from Schenck v. United States. But Fortas resigned from the Court in some disrepute before his
opinion could issue; Justice Brennan then revised Fortas’s draft, eliminating the “clear and present
danger” test, and the opinion was issued per curiam. See Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand:
Clear and Present Danger or Advocacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 209, 237 (1994).
74. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449.
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impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.”75
As Professor Schwartz notes, the Brandenburg test “replaced” prior
formulations.76 Indeed, Brandenburg has become the “canon” in contemporary
constitutional texts.77 However, it ignores the alternative ground affirmed in
Chaplinsky: words which “by their very utterance inflict injury.”
3. R.A.V. and Virginia v. Black

And now we come to the two “modern” cross-burning cases: R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul and, a decade later, Virginia v. Black.78 It seems fair to say
that these two decisions are in some tension with each other.79 But neither
decision clearly condemns a narrow hate-speech prohibition. Indeed, I
contend that Virginia v. Black clearly would support one.
In R.A.V., teenagers burned a “crudely made cross” in the front yard “of
a black family that lived across the street.”80 They were prosecuted under a
city ordinance that prohibited “symbol[s]” that “arouse anger, alarm, or
resentment in others on the basis of race.” The Minnesota Supreme Court
ruled that the law survived strict scrutiny because it was “narrowly-tailored”
to further a “compelling governmental interest.”81 But a 5-4 majority of the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down the ordinance as being impermissibly
75. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448. The Brandenburg Court overruled the Court’s prior
decision in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), which had upheld California’s similar
criminal syndicalism law. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447, 449.
76. Schwartz, supra note 73, at 236, 237–238.
77. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 33, at 1373 (“the key case”); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1075 (7th ed. 2013) (“the Court has adhered to Brandenburg). But see,
LEE BOLLINGER & GEOFFREY R. STONE, EPILOGUE TO ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN
THE MODERN ERA 312 (2001) (asking “whether the Brandenburg era will turn out to be just one
era among many, in which the freedom of speech varies widely”).
78. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
One might also add Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), to the list of cases that are
doctrinally supportive of a carefully drawn hate speech prohibition. But in the interests of time and
space, I omit further discussion because Mitchell is more an equal protection decision than a free
speech decision. In Mitchell, the Court upheld a state statute that allowed more severe sentences
for crimes committed with a hostile racial motive, than for the same crimes without such a motive.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 485, 489. The Court distinguished the case from R.A.V. as involving
“conduct” not expression. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487. But the Court also used the harm-based
theory later endorsed in Virginia v. Black, noting that “bias-inspired conduct is thought to inflict
greater individual and societal harm” than the same conduct without the bias. Mitchell, 508 U.S.
at 488 (emphasis added).
79. Thus, the author of the Court’s opinion in R.A.V., Justice Scalia, dissented in part in
Virginia v. Black and indeed explained that he would have gone further toward upholding the statute
in Black.
80. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379–383.
81. In re Welfare of R.A., 464 N.W. 2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991).
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“content-based.” That is, the R.A.V. statute selected race speech from other
types of “angering” speech and then denied it protection. Still, in the course
of outlining this new doctrinal tool, the Court affirmed that its precedents
support a “limited categorical approach” to the First Amendment, and found
no need to modify the Chaplinsky test for fighting words. Indeed, the Court
cited Beauharnais, as well as obscenity decisions, as recognizing “traditional
limitations” on free speech.83 Indeed, Justice Scalia explained that “these
areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated
because of their constitutionally proscribable content.”84
But then, in order to explain “the exclusion of ‘fighting words’ from
the . . . First Amendment” while yet distinguishing the statute at issue in
R.A.V., Justice Scalia delivered one of the more confusing statements of his
often Delphic oeuvre: “[F]or purposes of th[e First] Amendment, the
unprotected features of the words are, despite their verbal character,
essentially a ‘nonspeech’ element of communication.”85 I think it is fair to
say that in the quarter century since R.A.V., no one understands what,
precisely, this aphorism means. Other than this: some words, “despite their
verbal character,” are simply “nonspeech” that the First Amendment does
not protect. Where is the textualist in this?
Continuing in this mysterious vein, Justice Scalia went on to explain
that “when the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the
very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable,” then contentbased speech discrimination is permitted.86 This appeared to be a newly
developed explanation for distinguishing past speech-limiting precedents,

82. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393. Four other Justices concurred in the result only, see id. at 397.
83. Interestingly, Justice Scalia described Beauharnais as a “defamation” case, without
further explanation, and then noted only that “our decisions since the 1960s have narrowed the . . .
defamation” exception. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383. This is an artful dodge that the Justice often
employed: Noting a case that is apparently contrary to current doctrine and then merely noting the
current doctrine without approving it.
84. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (emphasis in the original).
85. Id. at 386.
86. This was offered as a “bas[i]s for distinction” of the R.A.V holding from prior “fighting
words” precedents that had affirmed convictions. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 390. “There may be other
such bases as well,” and Justice Scalia offered a few, such as “secondary effects,” and criminal
laws that “incidentally” punish speech (e.g. treason). Id. at 389–90. Interestingly, at this point
Justice Scalia also endorsed a new concept—“sexually derogatory ‘fighting words’”—as a way of
explaining why federal sex discrimination laws can prohibit them. Id. Why racially-derogatory
fighting words—that is, “hate speech”—would not also fit within this concept—or whether in fact
they might—was not addressed, even though that question was the precise focus of the R.A.V.
inquiry. Id.
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not a rephrasing of previously seen doctrinal principles. Again, no one
since has since been quite certain what Justice Scalia meant.88 (Thus Justice
Scalia’s mesmerizing genius with language sometimes clouded the precise
judgment of his colleagues, who on occasion would just silently join his
semantically adept opinions in doctrinally difficult cases.)
Most significantly for current purposes, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the
Court stated that when there is “no realistic possibility that official
suppression of ideas is afoot,” then “the regulation of ‘fighting words’ . . .
may address some offensive instances” even if it might be described as
“content discrimination.”89 He clearly (if footnotedly) noted that the
“presumptive invalidity” of content discrimination “does not mean
invariable invalidity.”90 But cross-burning, he concluded without additional
explanation, simply did not fit into this “general exception.”91
Whether its result was right or wrong, R.A.V. is significant for my
purposes because the Court fully acknowledged that the interests underlying
enactment of the St. Paul hate-speech statute were “compelling.”92
“Ensuring the basic human rights of members of groups that have been
historically subjected to discrimination, including the right of such group
members to live in peace where they wish” (that is, without cross-burnings
on their front lawn) is an interest that can survive strict scrutiny.93 Such

87. The other four Justices in R.A.V. concurred only in the judgment (three writing
separately), viewing the statute as “overbroad” but otherwise writing that perhaps a prohibition of
race-based hate speech could be constitutional. Justice White characterized Justice Scalia’s
analysis as a “nonexhaustive list of ad hoc exceptions” designed to “confine . . . its decision to the
facts of this case.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 407. Justice Blackmun separately characterized the Scalia
opinion as “an aberration . . . where the Court manipulated doctrine.” Id. at 415. He wrote that
“the people of St. Paul” should not be “prevent[ed] . . . from specifically punishing the race-based
fighting words that so prejudice their community.” Id. at 416. Justice Stevens wrote separately to
similarly approve the statute, noting that “threatening someone because of her race or religious
beliefs may cause particularly severe trauma or [there’s that persistent ‘or’ again] touch off a riot,”
and opining that “there are legitimate, reasonable and neutral justifications for such special rules.”
Id. at 416. Justice O’Connor silently joined Justice White’s short jurisdictional concurrence in the
result, see infra note 88.
88. In an additional brief concurrence in the R.A.V. judgment joined by all four concurring
Justices, Justice White called Justice Scalia’s rationale a “novel theory” that had not been argued
below or presented in the arguments to the Supreme Court. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 397. Meanwhile,
Justice Scalia dismissed Justice Stevens’ dissenting view as “wordplay”—as if his own opinion (or
indeed the entire enterprise of legal analysis) were something else. Id. at 392.
89. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992).
90. Id. at 390 n.6.
91. Id. at 393.
92. Id. at 395.
93. Id. at 395.
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expressive conduct is “reprehensible.” But because the City could have
enacted a constitutional ordinance (really?) prohibiting speech that “arouses
anger, alarm, or resentment in others” without reference to content-based
groups—that is, not restricted to race—an ordinance that was so limited fell
under the First Amendment. The irony of this rationale, of course, is that it
turns the concept of a “narrowly-tailored” statute on its head. The problem
in R.A.V., apparently, was that the law was too narrow—but a less-specific
statute banning all “fighting words” of any kind would survive? As Justice
Blackmun wrote separately, “deciding that a State cannot regulate speech
that causes great harm unless it also regulates speech that does not . . . set[s]
law and logic on their heads.”95
And now, finally,96 we come to the Court’s most recent hate-speech
decision, Virginia v. Black, in which the Court appeared to repudiate some
of the ideas in R.A.V., and concluded in no uncertain terms that “a State,
consistent with the First Amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with
the intent to intimidate.”97 The Court’s decision made explicit what I think
has been clear for a century: that the “or” in Chaplinsky’s definition of
“fighting words” has significance, and that speech that either incites
imminent lawbreaking or is intended to harm others “by its very utterance,”
may be regulated without constitutional violation.98

94. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395.
95. Id. at 415.
96. Opponents of any hate speech prohibition might also invoke the Court’s recent decision
in Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744 (2017), which struck down on First Amendment grounds a statute
that prohibited the registration of trademarks that “disparage” or “bring . . . into . . . disrepute” any
“persons.” But even putting aside that there was no controlling majority opinion, Matal seems
quite distinguishable, as it broadly banned “ideas that offend” (Id. at 1751 (opinion of Alito, J.),
and did not contain the narrowing elements in the draft statute I have proposed. See infra p. 599–
601.
97. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347 (2003). With respect, Dean Chemerinsky and his
coauthor appear to misinterpret or mischaracterize this ruling to the opposite effect, writing in 2017
that in Black the Court “conclude[ed] that cross burning generally is protected speech.”
CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 1, at 96. But the quoted holding of the Court in Black—
that cross burning is not protected speech when there is intent to intimidate (which is the very
definition of hate speech)—was plainly shared by six Justices: the four who joined Justice
O’Connor’s opinion (538 U.S. at 347), as well as Justice Scalia (the author of R.A.V.), joined by
Thomas (id. at 368, Scalia concurring). Indeed, three Justices wrote separately that they would go
even further in not protecting the expression at issue. See id. at 368 (Stevens concurring); id. at
368 (Scalia, joined by Thomas, concurring in part); id. at 388 (Thomas dissenting because he
viewed cross burning as conduct, not expression at all, and thus would have allowed its prohibition).
Only Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, rejected what
was perceived to be the majority’s “flexible . . . virulence exception” to the First Amendment. Id.
at 382.
98. Dean Chemerinsky is one of the few scholars who recognizes that Chaplinsky in fact
“recognizes two situations” in which speech may be regulated: not just when “likely to cause a
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In Black, three persons had been convicted under a Virginia statute for
burning a cross “on the property of another, a highway, or other public
place . . . with the intent of intimidating any person or group.”99 Black had
led a Ku Klux Klan rally where a large cross was burned and visible from
the public highway.100 Elliott and O’Mara, unaffiliated with the Klan, had
burned a cross in the yard of Elliott’s next-door African-American
neighbor.101 In addition to defining the crime, the Virginia statute provided
that “any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of” the
necessary intent.102 This additional “prima facie evidence” provision led the
Court to reverse the convictions.103 But the Court made clear that the
definition of the crime itself passed First Amendment muster.104
Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court presented a somewhat detailed
history of cross burning, noting that “the Klan used cross burnings as a tool of
intimidation and a threat of impending violence.”105 The connection between
cross burnings and the Klan’s doctrine of racial and religious hatred “became
indelible” and was “inextricably intertwined.”106 “While a burning cross does
not inevitably convey a message of intimidation,” it is often “designed to
inspire in the victim a fear of bodily harm.”107
With this history in mind, the Court noted that while the First
Amendment’s protection of “offensive” and “distasteful” ideas is a “bedrock
principle,” the constitutional protections “are not absolute.”108 The Court then
recited Chaplinsky’s definition of fighting words: “words which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”109
The Brandenburg test is devoted to the second of these alternatives: inciting
“imminent lawless action.”110 But the decision in Virginia v. Black was plainly

violent response” but also “when it is an insult likely to inflict immediate emotional harm.”
CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 1, at 91 (both emphases added). But he then goes on to
misread Black as holding that cross-burning falls into neither category, see supra note 97.
99. Black, 538 U.S. at 348.
100. Id. at 348–49.
101. Id. at 350.
102. Black, 538 U.S. at 348.
103. Id. at 367.
104. Id. at 363.
105. Id. at 354.
106. Id. at 353, 354. That the KKK stands for racial and religious hatred ought to require no
citation today. If one is needed, see Ku Klux Klan, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., https://www.splcenter.
org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/ku-klux-klan (last visited Dec. 24, 2017).
107. Black, 538 U.S. at 357.
108. Id. at 358.
109. Id. at 359 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
110. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (1969).
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founded on the first alternative: “words which by their very utterance inflict
injury” or are intended to cause harm to the target.111 The “or” in Chaplinsky
has constitutional, distinguishing, significance.
The Black Court also noted that “true threats” may be regulated or
banned: “statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals.”112 The First Amendment rationale of
Black clearly applies to groups, not just individuals. As importantly, the
Court explained that “the speaker need not actually intend to carry out the
threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats ‘protects individuals from the
fear of violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders.’”113 Thus
speech that is intended to intimidate may be prohibited under the First
Amendment: “[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the
word is a type of true threat” based on an “intent of placing the victim in fear
of bodily harm or death.”114
The Court clearly rejected the argument that because Virginia’s statute
selected cross-burning as one out of perhaps many types of intimidating
expression, it must fall under R.A.V.’s “content-neutral” rule. No, the court
explained: “[j]ust as a State may regulate only that obscenity which is most
obscene due to its prurient content, so too may a State choose to prohibit
only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily
harm.”115 Of course, a “sense of anger or hatred” inspired by cross burning
in its observers “is not sufficient”—the cross burning must be “intended to
intimidate” in the sense discussed.116
Whether viewed as a “fighting words” or a “true threats” case, Black
affirmed that the expressive act of cross burning may be criminalized when
done hatefully. The constitutional bottom line of Black seems clear:

111. Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
112. Id. at 359 (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying notes 38-41 (discussion of
“true threats” doctrine).
113. Black, 538 U.S. at 360.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 366.
116. Black, 538 U.S. at 366. It was for this reason as well as others that Justice O’Connor wrote
for a plurality that the convictions must be reversed—the “prima facie evidence” provision of the
statute allowed for conviction without proof of the requisite intention to intimidate. Id. at 367.
Significantly, however, the Court’s opinion left open the possibility that two of the three defendants’
convictions might still stand, or be retried, after Virginia examined its statute and the record in light
of the Court’s new analysis. Id. at 366–67. In fact, on remand, the Virginia Supreme Court held that
the prima facie evidence provision in its statute was severable, the remainder of its cross-burning
statute was constitutional as the U.S. Supreme Court had stated, and therefore the remaining
defendants’ convictions were affirmed. Elliot v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 464, 476 (2004).
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“particularly virulent” intimidating speech may be selected, constitutionally,
for a statutory ban.117

IV. A Draft Hate Speech Prohibition: Analysis and Explanations
In light of Black, and pulling together the various strands discussed
above, there is a strong case that a statute banning some forms of hate speech,
coupled with a strong intent standard, could pass First Amendment muster.
Five points, at least, seem clear:
1. A statute can be based on an intent in the speaker to create “fear”
and “disruption” in the minds and lives of its targets.118
2. A statute may also ban, in addition to imminent law-breaking,
words “which by their very utterance inflict injury.”119 Injury—not
lawbreaking. Indeed, this point flows directly from Justice Holmes’s
famous aphorism in Abrams almost exactly one-hundred years ago.
Why, exactly, may falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater be
prohibited? Clearly, it seems, because it may lead directly to injury of
others. This is so whether or not “imminent lawbreaking” is likely.
Indeed, because a shout of “fire” stimulates lawful speedy exiting,
law-breaking per se seems unlikely. Nevertheless, speech that directly
causes injury may be regulated or banned.
3. A corollary to point 2 is that empirical evidence is necessary to
support the constitutionality of an injury-preventing speech statute.
Virginia v. Black demonstrates this: The “inextricable” entwinement
of cross-burning, violence, and fear was explicated at some length
before the “intimidating” link was relied upon.
4. A statute may ban speech targeted at groups, as well as specific
individuals.120
5. A statute need not address all forms of hate speech, or intimidating
speech, but may be restricted to “particularly virulent” intimidating
speech.121

A. A Draft Statute as a Starting Point for a Hate Speech Prohibition

With these premises in mind, what might the language of a
constitutionally permissible hate speech statute look like? Importantly, one
that might also satisfy the United States’ obligations under Article IV of the
ICRED treaty, even with the United States’ constitutional reservation? I’ll
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 359 (quoting Chaplinsky).
Id.
Id. at 363.
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take a stab at it here, knowing full well that it is far easier to critique a
proposal than to construct a satisfactory one.
Hate Speech Prohibited:
(a) It shall be unlawful to make any speech at a public gathering or on
public media that asserts or is clearly premised on the racial or
religious inferiority or hatred of a minority group and is intended to
intimidate or injure any individual or member of the targeted group.
(b) An intent to intimidate shall be defined as an intent to create in the
targeted individual or group a fear of bodily harm or violence. Intent
to injure shall include intent to cause others to imminently injure the
target(s) as well as intent to cause demonstrable nontrivial harm to a
target’s physical or psychological wellbeing. The requisite intent shall
include willful blindness to reasonably known harms caused by such
speech.
B. Explanatory Points

My small doctrinal project done, here are just a few explanatory points:
1. The draft statute is limited to “public gatherings” and “public media.”
Private speech is not targeted. But televised speeches or publically
distributed podcasts are. Books are not intended to be included within
“public media.”122 Judicial development and legislative honing would
be necessary to more precisely define the scope.
2. “Clearly premised on” will reach hate speech where the hateful
racial or religious targeting is semantically masked. “Those people,”
“people like them,” etc. As in Black, context will be essential to prove
a violation.123
3. The draft statute extends beyond race-hatred speech to hate speech
based on religion as well. The ICRED Convention mentions only
“racial” hatred or superiority. But the history of religion used as a
surrogate for racial or ethnic hatred is strong (for example, Nazi hatred
of the “Jewish race;” contemporary advocacy of a “Muslim ban”).
Sponsors of this statute will have to assemble a more detailed
empirical/historical foundation for this.
4. The most important aspect of this draft statute is its premise that
hate speech can directly cause harm to individuals and groups. It is
far beyond the scope of this Essay to attempt to assemble, or even
summarize, all the empirical work that has been done on the harms

122. I recognize this as a large doctrinal hole, which deserves a much fuller explanation. Why
is speech different from books? The immediacy of their impact? The ease with which targets can
avoid a book?
123. See, Black, 538 U.S. at 367 (“contextual factors . . . are necessary to decide whether a
particular [expression] is intended to intimidate”).
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124

caused by hate speech.
Moreover, determining how and where the
“line” should be drawn between “demonstrable non-trivial harm” to a
target’s “psychological wellbeing” (which would be proscribed) and
generalized feelings of discomfort, dislike, or insecurity (which would
not be) is undoubtedly difficult. Still, intending to cause immediate
harm, such as intending to stimulate a crowd to engage in violence (as
appears to have happened in Charlottesville), as well as intending to
engender lasting psychological injury, would be within the reach of
this statute.
5. Furthermore, not just “positive knowledge” but also “willful
blindness” is reached by this statute.125 If harms likely caused by hate
speech are reasonably well-known, it would be no automatic defense
to falsely claim “I didn’t know” or “I didn’t mean it.” As with all
difficult questions of criminal intent, this would instead be a jury
question and would necessarily require assessment of context, as well
as strict application of the criminal “proof beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard.126
6. Finally, the statute targets hate speech that is directed at “minority”
groups. This is premised on an assertion that hate-speech directed at
racial or religious minorities is a “particularly virulent”127 evil that
may be targeted as likely to directly cause non-trivial harm. This is
premised to some extent on the familiar Carolene Products footnote
four idea that minority groups may properly receive heightened
constitutional protection.128 Virginia v. Black can be read to permit
such under-inclusive speech regulation, despite R.A.V.’s suggestions
to the contrary. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Justice
Scalia, author of R.A.V., joined the speech-prohibition conclusions in
Black without qualification (and in fact, would have gone farther than
Justice O’Connor’s opinion).

124. See supra notes 17–23; Martin, supra note 4; Hiroshi Fukurai & Alice Yang, The History
of Japanese Racism, Japanese American Redress, and the Dangers Associated with Government
Regulation of Hate Speech, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 533 (2018); Junko Kotani, Proceed with
Caution: Hate Speech Regulation in Japan, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603 (2018).
125. See generally Jewell v. United States, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) and id. at
705–706 (Kennedy J. dissenting); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A, 563 U.S. 754, 755
(2011) (“The doctrine of willful blindness is well-established in criminal law.”).
126. Thus, courts have cautioned that the Jewell willful blindness instruction should be
carefully and infrequently used; and the jury must be informed that if it believes that a defendant
actually believed to the contrary, it cannot convict. See, e.g., United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d
913 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hansen, 791 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2015).
127. Black, 538 U.S. at 363.
128. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see David A.
Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251 (2010); Bruce A. Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products
Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087 (1982).
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Conclusion
Some popular observers have argued that the unexpected Trump
Presidency has given “permission” or “new life” to racialized hate speech in
America today. Certainly, the events and fervor surrounding Charlottesville
in August 2017 made our September Symposium on “Hate Speech Laws in
Japan in Comparative Perspective” a surprisingly timely one. Professor
Martin’s keynote article explains the basis for what many First Amendment
scholars believe to be true: A statute banning hate speech cannot survive
constitutional scrutiny in the United States, despite the U.S.’s obligation in
ICRED to the contrary.
This Essay is intended to demonstrate that the constitutional
condemnation of a carefully drawn and administered hate speech prohibition
is not as clear as some First Amendment defenders assert. Virginia v. Black
clearly endorses the constitutionality of statutes that would prohibit
“particularly virulent” versions of intimidating hate speech intended to, or
likely causing, harm. This Essay takes that suggestion, and similar
suggestions found in prior First Amendment decisions, to argue that a
narrowly drawn and carefully administered statute prohibiting racial and
religious hate speech might not be unconstitutional. I do not advocate such
a statute, and am fully aware of the slippery slope arguments that American
history supports regarding the danger of allowing even a small portion of the
camel’s nose into the tent. But constitutional scholars should confront what
the precedents actually say, rather than rely on what they believe the “spirit”
of the 1960s version of the First Amendment “must” condemn.
Finally, this Essay proposes specific statutory language merely to begin
a debate, not to settle it. Surely my proposal is inadequate and can be greatly
improved. And the dangers of discretion are real—perhaps such a statute
should not be tried at all.
But the dangers and harms caused by virulent race and religion hate
speech are also real. They are significant. The United States has joined an
international treaty effort that seeks to condemn the evils of race
discrimination. We should see where the actual language of precedent, and
the consequent debate, leads, rather than circling the wagons of agreement
on unconstitutionality without question.

